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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE OF SEAMEN: Smith v. Atlas
Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc.
Jerry Smith, a seaman employed for an indefinite term by Atlas
Off-Shore Boat Service (Atlas), sprained an ankle while working aboard
an Atlas vessel. After six weeks of convalescence, Smith returned
to work for a full two-week shift aboard another Atlas vessel. Smith's
attorney then notified Atlas of the seaman's intention to file a per-
sonal injury claim under the Jones Act.' When Smith refused to aban-
don his claim, the Atlas port captain fired him. Smith then brought
an action against Atlas for retaliatory discharge under general
maritime law in addition to his negligence claim under the Jones Act.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that an employer has an ab-
solute right to discharge a seaman for good, bad, or no cause; yet
when a substantial motivating factor of the discharge is retaliation
for the seaman's pursuit of a personal injury claim, the employer will
be liable for compensatory damages arising from the maritime tort
of retaliatory discharge. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Services, Inc.,
653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).
Prior to Smith, no admiralty court had been presented with a claim
for retaliatory discharge under the general maritime law. In particular,
the question of whether maritime employers could discharge seamen
in retaliation for their exercise of rights guaranteed by the Jones Act
remained unresolved. A maritime retaliatory discharge action should
be based upon a theory of recovery which brings the claim within
admiralty jurisdiction and which adequately protects seamen from
retaliatory discharge.
On both land and sea, courts interpret the contract of employ-
ment according to the "at-will" rule. This doctrine provides that either
the employer or the employee can terminate the employment rela-
tionship at any time unless a term of employment is explicitly agreed
upon.2 While admiralty courts have had only limited occasion to apply
Copyright, 1982 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 46 U.S.C. 5 688 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Findley v. Red Top Super Markets, Inc., 188 F.2d 834, 837 n.1 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 870 (1951); Bramblett v. Wilson, 413 So. 2d 600, 602 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1982); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484 (1976). The at-will rule arose in America in the
late nineteenth century; under English common law at that time, a one year term
was implied in all employment contracts unless the parties specified otherwise. See
H. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT S 134, at 271-272 (1877). A minority viewpoint
treats the parties' intent as to termination of the contract as an open question of
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this "at-will" rule,3 the nonmaritime common law recognizes the
employer's right to discharge an at-will employee "for good cause, for
no cause, or even for cause morally wrong."' The absolute discharge
power constitutes one facet of "the employer's right to have a free
hand in the running of his business."'
Statutory and jurisprudential derogations from the at-will rule af-
ford some employees a measure of protection from retaliatory
discharge. A few federal and state statutes establish a cause of ac-
tion for covered employees who are discharged for a cause specifically
reprobated by the particular statute.' Further, a minority of state
courts recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.'
Yet, the at-will doctrine remains the rule rather than the excep-
tion. Even in those jurisdictions which allow a claim for retaliatory
discharge, the employer usually may fire workers out of malice or
caprice.' The plaintiff states a claim for retaliatory discharge only upon
fact. See, e.g., Cleary v. American'Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 451-52, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 727 (1980); 1 C. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
S 160 at 519 (2d ed. 1913).
3. See, e.g., Findley v. Red Top Super Markets, Inc., 188 F.2d at 837 n.1 (even
if the purported master's hiring of a crew were authorized, the verbal employment
contract was terminable at will; hence the owner owed no wages past the date he
dismissed the crew); The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241 (4th Cir. 1907); The Pacific, .18 F. 703
(D. Md. 1883) (the district court relied on the at-will rule to prorate a seaman's monthly
wage to the date of discharge). Merchant seamen sign articles which establish a term
of employment commensurate with the duration of the voyage; these seamen can seek
damages for premature termination of the employment contract. Bunn v. Global Marine,
Inc., 428 F.2d 40, 45 (5th Cir. 1970); 46 U.S.C. SS 564, 594 (1976). The instant case
is concerned only with the employment relation of "brown water'.' seamen-maritime
workers who possess the requisite occupational attachment to a vessel in navigation
yet who have not signed on'for a specific voyage. For the test of seaman's status,
see Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
4. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), ,overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). Wood's at-will
rule, see note 2, supra, does not necessitate the drastic extrapolation of the employer's
discharge power which occurred at common law. Wood's treatise describes a rule of
evidence for ascertaining the duration of the contract without stating affirmatively
or negatively whether the parties' right to termination is limited by any requirement
of good faith or whether a termination could constitute fault in some circumstances.
5. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act,' 29 U.S.C. S 215(a)(3) (1978); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978) (the act allows recovery for discharges
in retaliation for filing of a workman's compensation claim).
7. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307
(1981); Campbell v. Ford Industries, Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976).
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demonstrating that he was discharged "because he performed an act
that public policy would encourage, or refused to do what public policy
would condemn."' This "public policy exception" to the at-will rule
seldom applies in the absence of a statutorily conferred right or a
statutorily imposed duty." Judicial restraint and the vitality of the
employer's right to manage his business militate against extensive
jurisprudential modification of the common law rule."
While most of the retaliatory discharge cases have adopted a tort
theory of recovery,' a few state courts have classified the action as
a breach of an implied obligation in the employment contract.'3 Com-
mentators disagree as to which theory of recovery extends more pro-
tection from the threat of retaliatory discharge." However, the
classification of the cause of action has had little effect in this regard.
The extent to which courts will expand the "public policy exception,"
rather than the "tort" or "contract" label, has determined the ambit
of protection provided by the common law retaliatory discharge
action. 5
The perspective of an admiralty court which is considering the
viability of a retaliatory discharge action differs significantly from a
court considering the same issue under state law. At the outset, the
maritime tribunal exercises a limited, rather than a general,
jurisdiction.6 Yet within that limited jurisdiction, the court enjoys a
greater freedom to fashion substantive law. 7 Moreover, an admiralty
9. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. 1980). But see,
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 & 1066 (Ind. 1980).
Cf Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (the court would
not allow a cause of action for retaliatory discharge without express legislative
authorization).
12. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
13. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
14. Compare Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419-21 (1967) with
Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment
At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 482-87 (1980).
15. Compare Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (the
court sought to protect a broad societal interest in stable employment through a con-
tractual retaliatory discharge action) with Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295,
414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (the court construed Monge narrowly, bringing New Hampshire's
contractual action in accord with the public policy exception in tort).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 1. See text at notes 19-23, infra.
17. See text at notes 24-25, infra.
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court applies a body of law which is distinguished by its "purely com-
mercial origins and purposes." 8
In admiralty, the delictual or contractual nature of the claim
asserted determines the jurisdictional criteria to be applied. The
prevailing test for admiralty jurisdiction over torts requires that the
wrong possess both "locality" and "maritime flavor."19 The tort has
maritime "locality" when the damage or injury takes effect upon
navigable waters.' Admiralty jurisdiction also extends to harm "caused
by a vessel on navigable waters, notwithstanding that such damage
or injury be done or consummated on land."'" "Maritime flavor" ex-
ists when the "wrong bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity."2 As for jurisdiction over contractual claims, the
presence of flavor alone suffices. Admiralty jurisdiciton embraces con-
tracts which by their nature and subject matter bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.2"
Within the constraints of their jurisdiction, the maritime courts
function as the primary generators of substantive law. Due to con-
gressional acquiesence, "the Judiciary had traditionally taken the lead
18. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 527 (5th Cir. 1973) (Morgan, J., dissenting). See
text at notes 26-39, infra.
19. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Richard-
son v. Foremost Ins. Co., 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981), affd, 102 S.Ct. 2654 (1982); Maraist,
Developments in the Law, 1980-81 - Admiralty, 42 LA. L. REV. 469 (1982). But see Carroll
v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1975).
20. See, e.g., The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
21. Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. S 740 (1976).
22. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 268. The Fifth Circuit,
in Kelly v. Smith, enumerated several factors which admiralty courts should look to
in determining whether a tort has maritime flavor: "the functions and roles of the
parties; the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and the
type of the injury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law." 485 F. 2d
at 525. Judge Morgan, in dissent, further clarified the policy considerations involved
in this determination. He noted that "[tihe law of admiralty has purely commercial
origins and purposes." Id. at 527. In the threshold question, the court seeks to deter-
mine whether there is a need for a "uniformity [which] provide[s] predictable and con-
stant relationships between parties engaged in maritime activities." Id. at 528. Thus,
the ultimate consideration in determining the presence of maritime flavor is whether
the situation requires a uniform national rule in order to encourage participation in
maritime commerce by businesses, investors, and workers.
23. See New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 26
(1870). The creation of a considerable body of precedent provides a degree of certainty
in maritime jurisdiction over contracts. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,
735 (1961). Further, the inherent requirement that the litigating parties be privy to




in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime.""4 The
maritime judiciary need not rely upon statutory guidance in order
to abrogate or modify long-standing principles of general maritime
law.25
In exercising this judicial activism, the admiralty courts adopt a
special solicitude for the promotion of maritime commerce.26 Further-
more, the courts have historically stood as the "guardians of seamen."'
This judicial role reflects admiralty law's concern for the welfare of
maritime workers. Maritime law seeks to protect seamen from the
hazards of their employment 8 as well as from overreaching by par-
ties with superior bargaining expertise.'
The Jones Act represents but one example of this long-standing
regard for "the benefit and protection of seamen.""° Under the Jones
Act, seamen can sue their employers for damages resulting from per-
sonal injuries suffered in the course of their employment.21 The
employer must compensate the seaman for his damages if the injury
can be attributed "in whole or in part"' to the employer's negligence.'
24. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975).
25. See, e.g., id.
26. "[T]he primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protec-
tion of maritime commerce..." Foremost v. Richardson, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2658 (1982).
Although disagreeing with the majority's application of this principle to the facts, Justice
Powell's dissenting opinion gathers considerable authority which evidence this com-
mercial interest. Id. at 2661, n.2-4. Cf. Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 514 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (the district court determined that a crew-ferrying off-
shore helicopter was a "vessel" for purposes of recovery under the Jones Act).
27. United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 355 (1971).
28. See text at notes 30-40, infra.
29. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. Inc., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Charpen-
tier v. Fluor Ocean Services, Inc., 613 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936). See also Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The personal in-
jury action provided by the Jones Act complements other remedies traditionally
available to seamen. The employer must furnish maintenance and cure, i.e., food, lodg-
ing, and medical care until maximum recovery, to seamen who become sick or injured
in the service of the ship. See, e.g., Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). The
vessel and its operators are liable for damages resulting from seamen's injuries caused
by a breach of the duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158,
175 (1903).
31. See 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1976).
32. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. S 51 (1976). The Jones Act applies
sections 51-60 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to seamen. Kernan v. American
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 429 n.3 (1958).
33. [Flor practical purpose the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more
than the single question whether negligence of the employer played any part,
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Neither the defense of assumption of risk nor the fellow servant doc-
trine bar recovery under the Act." Further, the seaman's contributory
negligence can only reduce the amount of recovery.35 The
"featherweight"' burden of proof on causation 7 and the removal of
the traditional common law defenses "provide liberal recovery for in-
jured workers."38 The Act protects seamen from the hazards of
maritime employment by encouraging employers to be solicitous of
seamen's safety. Seamen benefit from the Act because the cost of
industrial injury is borne by the employer."0
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit engaged in "striking the balance
between""1 the employer's discharge power and the seaman's Jones
Act rights. While reaffirming the maritime employer's "absolute
discharge right,""2 the court asserted that this power "should not be
used as a means of effectuating a 'purpose ulterior to that for which
the right was designed.' "s The panel concluded that the employer
should be prevented from exercising his discharge right to retaliate
against or to intimidate seamen seeking compensation for personal
injuries.,
The Fifth Circuit has placed a weighty burden upon a seaman
who claims that he was discharged in retaliation for filing his per-
sonal injury claim. The seaman must show that his claim for personal
however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit. The burden
of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises,
when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury
may with reason make that inference.
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
34. See 45 U.S.C. SS 51, 54 (1976).
35. See id. at S 53.
36. Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1975); G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 377 (2d ed. 1975).
37. See note 33, supra.
38. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. at 432.
39. "IT]he employers' liability law ... places such stringent liability upon [employers]
for injuries to their employees as to compel the highest safeguarding of the lives and
limbs of the men in this dangerous employment." S. REP. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1910). See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. "It was the intention of Congress ... to shift the burden of the loss resulting
from these casualties from those 'least able to bear it' and place it upon those who
can . . . 'measurably control their causes.'" S. REP. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910)
(quoting St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 296 (1908)). See Kernan
v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. at 431.
41. 653 F.2d at 1064.




injury was the substantial motivating factor" in the employer's deci-
sion to discharge him." Absent this retaliatory intent, the employer
can fire the seaman for any or no cause "in most circumstances.""0
If the employer shows by a preponderance of the evidence that he
would have fired the seaman regardless of the personal injury suit,
then the employer will defeat the retaliatory discharge claim. 7
The Fifth Circuit noted that a seaman's disability would give the
employer a valid independent motivation for discharge.48 In Smith, the
seaman's additional claim for lost future wages due to permanent par-
tial disability indicated that this independent ground for termination
might have been present. The court implicitly rejected any conten-
tion that the mere allegation of permanent disability would
automatically validate the discharge as one for good cause. Instead,
the court relied on the captain's testimony that Smith was fit for
seaman's duties in order to deny both Smith's permanent disability
claim and the employer's defense to the retaliatory discharge claim. 9
The court did not explain its reasons for recognizing the
retaliatory discharge claim in tort rather than in contract. Judge
Rubin, writing for the three judge panel, described the common law
retaliatory discharge action in a manner which attached minimal
significance to the choice of the theory of recovery:
Whether grounded in tort or contract, the cause of action is based
on the notion that the employer's conduct in discharging the
employee constitutes an abuse of the employer's absolute right
to terminate the employment relationship when the employer
utilizes that right to contravene an established public policy.
5
With no further elucidation, the court concluded that maritime
"retaliatory discharge is properly characterized as an intentional
tort."51
44. The Supreme Court explains how this test operates in: Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977); Mount Healthy
City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
45. 653 F.2d at 1063.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1064. See also cases cited in note 44, supra. As a practical matter, the
employer should be able to defeat this action with testimony that he fired the seaman
for appropriate reasons, e.g., poor job performance or actions detrimental to crew morale.
Hereafter, maritime employers are not likely to be as candid in their reasons for
discharging litigious seamen as -was the port captain in the instant case.
48. 653 F.2d at 1063 n.18.
49. Id. at 1065 n.25.
50. Id. at 1062.
51. Id. at 1064.
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The opinion did not discuss the jurisdictional basis for recogni-
tion of retaliatory discharge as a maritime tort. This omission is un-
fortunate because the court's classification of this claim may have
significant ramifications for the test of admiralty jurisdiction over
torts. The panel's classification presents jurisdictional difficulties
because the newly-christened maritime tort very probably lacks the
requisite locality. The discharged seaman's economic loss and mental
distress do not occur on water;5 2 furthermore, the causal relation of
a vessel to the wrong is very attenuated.53
52. The discharge does have a coincidental effect which occurs on navigable waters;
a vessel sails without the services of the discharged seaman. However, this incidental
impact will not satisfy the traditional test of locality. See text at note 20, supra. "Under
the rule, a tort occurred where the [conduct] of the defendant took effect upon the
person or property of the plaintiff." Maraist, supra note 19, at 469. The impact of
the tort-feasor's conduct on the seaman, as plaintiff, and not a coincidental effect on
a vessel is the determinative factor for purposes of maritime locality. But cf. Carroll
v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1975) (the insurer's blacklisting
of litigious seamen was "felt in the operations of the affected vessels at sea"; the
court relied on a simple flavor test to support jurisdiction).
Further, the traditional locality test is not relevant to the question of whether
the court should exercise jurisdiction over the type of tort presented in the instant
case. This physical indicium is appropriate in determining whether the admiralty court
should have jurisdiction over a particular accident which causes damage to a person
or to property. If a collision or personal injury takes effect on navigable waters, maritime
commerce and navigation are usually involved. "Indeed, for the traditional types of
maritime torts, the traditional test has worked quite satisfactorily." Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 254. The locality test does little to distinguish
among torts which affect economic relationships rather than physical objects. See also
id. at 261. The conceptual standard, maritime flavor, better isolates rights and obliga-
tions which are important to maritime commerce.
53. When the seaman's employer also owns the vessel, jurisdiction over the
disharge might be obtained under the Admiralty Extension Act. See text at note 21,
supra. In Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), the Supreme Court
rejected an interpretation of the Act which would limit jurisdiction to "injuries ac-
tually caused by the physical agency of a vessel or a particular part of it." Id. at
209. This broad interpretation of the Act extends admiralty jurisdiction to a wide
variety of torts commited by the shipowner while operating the vessel. Lower courts
have upheld jurisdiction under the Act when a plaintiff alleges that the land-based
tort which caused him injury was in turn caused by the vessel. See Duluth Superior
Excursions, Inc. v. Makela, 623 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1980) (the plaintiff was run over
by a fellow passenger minutes after disembarking from a "booze cruise"); Callahan
v. Cheramie Boats, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1974) (the plaintiff was injured
while disembarking on a defective pier-based crane; the vessel had failed to provide
a safe alternate mode of egress). But cf. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202
(1971) (the Act does not provide jurisdiction over unseaworthiness claims when the
injury is not caused by the ship or its appurtenances). Arguably, the discharged seaman's
harm is "caused by a vessel" when the shipowner-employer discharges him, even when
acting through a land-based agent, e.g., a port captain. The tenability of this proposi-
[Vol. 43
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An absence of maritime locality does not necessarily render
retaliatory discharge an inappropriate claim in admiralty. Indeed, the
connection of this wrongful conduct to traditional maritime activity
is especially pronounced.' However, the court drifted into controver-
sial waters by grounding the claim in tort when maritime flavor pro-
vided the only jurisdictional base.
Whether courts should "abandon the requirement of a maritime
locality 'altogether""5 and apply flavor as the sole criterion of admiralty
tion depends upon whether the act discharging seamen can be construed as part of
the operating of the vessel. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. at 210.
However, this construction of the Admiralty Extension Act will not support jurisdic-
tion in all instances of retaliatory discharge because the vessel owner and the seaman's
employer are often distinct entities. In such cases, the employer's discharge cannot
be a tort committed by the shipowner while operating the vessel. Yet, jurisdiction
under the Act is not necessarily limited to claims against the vessel and its operator;
claims against defendants whose tortious conduct was caused by a vessel might be
heard under the Act. See Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1306-07
(9th Cir. 1970). In suits against a "nonvessel" defendant, the Fifth Circuit requires
that some act of the vessel must proximately cause the defendant's tortious conduct
before admiralty jurisdiction exists under the Act. See Karpovs v. State of Mississip-
pi, 663 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Harris County, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1972).
Thus, for the retaliatory discharge claim to fall within the scope of the Act, the seaman
would have to show that the vessel owner was responsible for the maritime employer's
decision to terminate employment. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 766, comment
g, at 10 (1977) (tort of intentional interference with contracts terminable at will).
54. "The complex and peculiar rules of admiralty are particularly suited for deciding
suits arising out of 'traditional maritime activities, involving navigation or commerce
on navigable waters.'" Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d at 527-528 (Morgan, J., dissenting),
quoting Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 256. "[T]he status of
the seaman in the employment of his ship . .. has from the beginning been peculiarly
within the province of the maritime law . O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42 (1943). "IThe subject matter, the seaman's right to compen-
sation for injuries received in the course of his employment, is one traditionally
cognizable in admiralty .... " Id. at 43. A uniform national rule is needed to protect
the seaman's personal injury claim from retaliatory discharge. Few state courts
recognize an action for retaliatory discharge. See text at notes 6-11, supra. If maritime
law does not provide a remedy for retaliatory discharge, seamen may find no relief
under the applicable state law. If seamen's personal injury claims are only haphazard-
ly protected from retaliatory discharge, seamen may hesitate to undertake maritime
employment. Thus, denial of maritime jurisdiction over this claim would lead to an
absurd result. A fundamental policy of the maritime law, compensation for seamen's
employment injuries, would be protected only by the vagaries of state law.
The scarcity of state retaliatory discharge actions also diminishes the effect of
reliance on the federal court's pendent jurisdiction. Whether the retaliatory discharge
action is in state court or is pendent to the Jones Act claim in federal court, state
substantive law would apply and seamen would obtain relief in only a minority of
the states.
55. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d at 527 n.1 (Morgan, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction over torts is unresolved. Under the "locality plus flavor"
test, some torts which bear a significant relationship to maritime com-
merce would nonetheless be excluded because they do not possess
locality. Adoption of a simple flavor standard for jurisdiction would
provide a more rational result in these cases; jurisdiction then would
depend upon the functional relationship of maritime law to the claim,'
regardless of fortuitous considerations of locality.
Yet, the rationality which a simple flavor test would furnish in
individual cases is offset by the need for a standard which produces
predictable results. What constitutes a "significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity"57 must be determined in an ad hoc
fashion until the judiciary develops a more precise formula for
maritime flavor.58 Thus, use of flavor as the sole criterion for jurisdic-
tion would tend to inhibit predictable and efficient resolution of the
threshold question.59 Further, under the nebulous bounds of maritime
flavor, admiralty jurisdiction conceivably could extend to matters oc-
curing far inland. An admiralty court, as a court of limited jurisdic-
tion, should be wary of a jurisdictional standard which might intrude
upon the traditional domain of state law."0 At present, the require-
ment of locality defines "the presumptive boundary of admiralty
jurisdiction"'" with a reasonable degree of certainty.6
56. See note 22, supra.
57. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 268.
58. For articles which advocate the abandonment of the locality requirement and
which suggest standards for a simple flavor test, see Bridwell & Whitten, Admiralty
Jurisdiction: The Outlook for the Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DuKE L.J. 757, 786-795;
Comment, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction: Floundering on the Sea of Inconsistency, 27 U.
FLA. L. REV. 805, 815-16 (1975).
59. "Jurisdiction should be as readily ascertainable as courts can make it." Richard-
son v. Foremost Ins. Co., 641 F.2d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 102 S.Ct. 2654 (1982).
60. See Victory Carriers, Inc; v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1971).
61. 404 U.S. at 214 n.14.
62. The traditional locality test, (see text at note 20, supra) was applied with
mechanical certainty. Admiralty jurisdiction was present when the tort took effect
upon navigable waters, but was absent when the tort took effect on land. (This latter
result has been modified by the Admiralty Extension Act, discussed in text at note
21, supra). Further, the test has been a fairly accurate indicator of when an admiralty
court should have jurisdiction. When harm or injury occurs on navigable waters (or
is caused by a vessel on navigable waters), maritime entities and activities usually
are involved. "[Tihe traditional test has worked quite satisfactorily [except in a few]
perverse and caustic borderline situations." Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland,
409 U.S. at 254. However, some courts have departed from the rule that the situs
of the injury determines the locality of the tort and have applied other measures of
locality. See Bridwell & Whitten, supra note 58, at 763-64; Comment, Torts Along the
Water's Edge: Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 98-99; Note, Tests
of Maritime Tort Jurisdiction, 44 TUL. L. REV. 166, 167-70 (1969). See also Black, Admiral-
ty Jurisdiction, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259, 264 (1950).
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The Smith court did not err in classifying maritime retaliatory
discharge as a tort. Yet, the panel should have confronted the uncer-
tainties presented by a simple flavor test when it exercised jurisdic-
tion over a tort which probably lacks maritime locality. Smith fur-
nishes a precedent for adoption of solely a flavor test for maritime
tort jurisdiction in the Fifth Circuit, but the opinion furnishes no
guidance as to how such a test would be applied consistently and with
due respect for the jurisdiction of state law. 3
The court could have avoided this jurisdictional difficulty by classi-
fying retaliatory discharge as a breach of the employment contract."
The seaman's employment contract is, by nature and subject matter,
a maritime contract. 5 Under well-established principles, an admiralty
court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim arising out of its
breach.
Of course, the court cannot classify a retaliatory discharge as a
breach of contract unless the discharge constitutes a breach of a con-
tractual duty. The court can find such a duty by recognizing a
reciprocal obligation of good faith performance in the at-will employ-
63. The "maritime-status exception to the locality rule" may provide a basis for
admiralty jurisdiction over Smith's claim. Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425
F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1970). This "status exception" is illustrated by the ability
of seamen to sue their employers in admiralty for shoreside injuries which are caused
by the employer's negligence. Status, rather than locality, provides the basis of ad-
miralty jurisdiction over these claims. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1943); Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946).
In Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), Judge Learned
Hand built upon O'Donnell to declare that "a tort, arising as it does out of a maritime
'status' or 'relation', is cognizable by the maritime law whether it arises on sea or
on land." Id. at 558. While not expressly approving Judge Hand's broad formulation
of maritime status jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has cited Strika in its discussion
of jurisprudential exceptions to the "locality rule". Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. at 259-260. The manner in which a tort "arises out of" a
maritime relationship for purposes of "status jurisdiction" remains unexplained.
Arguably, discharge of a seaman in retaliation for his initiation in a Jones Act
claim is a tort which "arises out of" a maritime relationship. As the Supreme Court
observed in O'Donnell, the seaman's right to compensation for injuries received in
the course of his employment . . . is one traditionally cognizable in admiralty." 318
U.S. at 43. When retaliatory discharge is directed at the seaman's exercise of this
"traditionally cognizable" right, the employer's intentional tort may "arise out of" the
employment relationship in a manner included within Judge Hand's "status exception"
to the "locality rule".
64. Cf. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (a termina-
tion motivated by bad faith constitutes a breach. of the employment contract). The
New Hampshire Supreme Court has construed this landmark case narrowly. See Howard
v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
65. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961).
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ment contract."' This implied duty would prohibit the employer from
exercising his discharge power to "injure the right of the [employee]
to receive the benefit of his bargain.""7
The duty of good faith performance serves only to assure that
an agreement is performed in a manner that is within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties. 8 In part, "the trade custom in the
industry""9 governs the parties' expectations regarding termination
of at-will employment. At the very least, an employee expects that
the employer will not use his discharge power to hinder the employee's
exercise of rights which are attached to the employment contract."
The employer's exercise of his termination right in a situation
like Smith constitutes a breach of the obligation of good faith perfor-
mance because the threat of retaliatory discharge deters seamen from
exercising their contractual and statutory rights to sue for damages
resulting from employment injuries. The seaman's right of recovery
66. This obligation requires that contracts "be performed according to the par-
ties' intent and in conformity with recognized standards of honesty and loyalty." 2
S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS S 4, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 6 (1975). This obliga-
tion is imposed by statute in civil law jurisdictions. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1901; CODE
CIVIL. art. 1134; Swiss CiV. CODE art. 2; JAPANESE CIV. CODE art. 1; BURGERLICHES GESETZ-
BUcH art. 242 (1900). See, e.g., National Safe Corp. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d
792 (La. 1979). Common law courts also recognzie the importance of the good faith
duty as a means of enforcing the fair intent of the parties. See Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 727-28 (1980); Burton, Breach
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV.
369, 404 (1980). See also U.C.C. S 2-203.
67. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?-Inductions From a
Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance Contracts, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 330, 332 (1980).
68. See generally Burton, supra note 65, at 403.
69. Comment, "At Will" Franchise Terminations and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine:
The Maturation of Louisiana Law, 42 LA. L. REV. 210, 238 (1981). See also Terrel v. Alex-
andria Auto Co., Inc., 125 So. 757 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930): "In interpreting a contract
not specific in its wording, it is necessary to take into consideration the custom of
the place and customary manner of fulfilling like contracts in arriving at what was
the reasonable expectation of the parties to the contract at the time it was made."
Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
70. See Snelling, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 178, 194
(1933):
[Ilt is readily seen that the requirement of performance in good faith is simply
a command that the parties act bona fide in effecting the cause which conditions
their respective obligations. Thus, cause being a condition which the contractant
would have expressed had he analyzed his motives and expectations, a "subvocal"
or "unvocalized" condition in the normal case, if these motives and expectations
are not realized through performance performed, the case presents a situation
of actual or constructive bad faith . ...
NOTES
and the employer's duty of compensation are inseparable incidents
of the employment contract." Congress secures to seamen the right
to sue their employer for damages from personal injuries suffered
in the course of employment. 2 If the injury can be attributed to the
employer's negligence, the employer must compensate the seaman for
his damages.73 This duty supplements the maritime employer's ancient
obligation to furnish maintenance and cure to seamen who become
sick or injured in the service of the ship.74 Maritime law affords these
remedies to seamen as an inducement to undertake the hazards of
maritime employment." The employer's attempt to avoid his contrac-
tual obligations by discharging claimants represents a bad faith exer-
cise of his contractual right to terminate the employment agreement.
Application of the obligation of good faith performance to the at-
will employment contract should not significantly alter the agreement.
In particular, the duty of good faith performance would not prohibit
employers from exercising their discharge power without cause. A
requirement that the employer have just cause before discharge is
necessary only when there is an expectation of job security. The
employer's right to discharge the employee for good, bad, or no cause
is an implied resolutory condition of the at-will employment contract.
Under such an agreement, the employee has no prospect of job
security. The duty to perform the at-will contract in good faith would
not create in and of itself an expectation of job permanency. The
requirement of good faith performance would not create promises
which, by the nature of the agreement, were not contemplated by
the parties. Thus, enforcing good faith in the at-will employment con-
tract would not impose a requirement that the employer have just
cause before dismissing his employees. The mere exercise of the
discharge power under an at-will employment contract will not deprive
71. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932).
72. See text at notes 30-40, supra.
73. See text at note 32, supra.
74. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1943).
75. "The design of the rule is to give encouragement to sailors, and induce a greater
number of persons to embrace the profession." R. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON MARITIME
CONTRACTS OF LETTING TO HIRE n* 189, at 114. (C. Cushing trans. 1821). See Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962); Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955).
76. Circumstances surrounding the formation and performance of the contract may
create an expectation of job security despite the absence of a specified term of employ-
ment. In order to protect the reasonable expectation of job security in such a situa-
tion, a duty of good faith performance prohibits discharges which are without just
cause. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980). Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2037: "Every condition must be performed in the manner
that it is probable the parties's wished and intended that it should be."
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the employee of anything which was promised to him under the
contract.7
Further, the extent to which the good faith duty would prohibit
maritime employers from discharging at-will seamen for bad or even
"morally reprehensible"" reasons is uncertain because application of
trade custom can only be determined in regard to the facts of each
case. However, the ambiguous scope of this theory of recovery for
retaliatory discharge should prove advantageous. The uncertainty pro-
vides admiralty courts with flexibility to tailor the retaliatory
discharge action to further the policies of protecting seamen and pro-
moting maritime commerce. The courts should not sanction a use of
the discharge power which would discourage a worker from entering
maritime employment. Conversely, the judiciary should not discourage
an employer from participating in the industry by significantly im-
pairing his "right to have a free hand in the running of [his] business."79
The interests of both employers and employees should be balanced
to provide a fair remedy which encourages the participation of both
groups in maritime commerce. Classification of retaliatory discharge
as a breach of a duty of good faith performance would facilitate this
balancing of interests by furnishing an adaptable theory of recovery.0
77. See, Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1839-1840 (1980). But see
Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment
At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980). This article proceeds on the premise that "[ilmply-
ing a right to reasonable, good cause, discharges would serve to reflect the probable
intent of the parties to the employment relationship." Id. at 482. Even if this premise
is true as to the employee, Professor Blackburn overlooks the "probable intent" of
one of the parties, the employer. The employer contracts with the expectation that
his right to control his business includes the right to discharge at-will employees at
his discretion. This expectation is recognized legally in the at-will rule. See note 2,
supra. Properly applied, the obligation of good faith balances the competing interests
of the parties in order to realize "the end pursued in common by all the parties."
S. LITVINOFF, supra note 65, at 6 (emphasis added). Good faith should not be relied upon
to completely nullify the employer's contractual right to discharge at will. Further,
Professor Blackburn places direct reliance on authority which does not support his
conclusion that good faith requires just cause for dismissal in at-will employment con-
tracts. See Blackburn, supra, at 490. The district court in Zimmer v. Wells Manage-
ment Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), applies the obligation of good faith to
renewal of a term employment contract which was accompanied by a stock-purchase plan.
78. 653 F.2d at 1063.
79. Id. at 1064.
80. Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal
rules than of practical adaption to the attainment of a just result will be troubled
by a classification where the lines of division are so wavering and blurred.
Something, doubtless, may be said on the score of consistency and certainty in
favor of a stricter standard. The courts have balanced such considerations against
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Smith presents one situation in which the obligation of good faith
performance prohibits an employer from discharging an employee. The
employer breaches the duty when he discharges seamen in retalia-
tion for the exercise of rights attached to their status. 1 Arguably,
the obligation also should extend to protect seamen from dismissals
in retaliation for the performance of legally imposed duties." These
duties form part of the circumstances in which the parties manifest
their consent to the employment contract. The employer and employee
cannot expect that the employee's compliance with these obligations
will operate as a resolutory condition of the contract.8 3 A duty of good
faith performance should prohibit the employer from placing seamen
in the dilemma of choosing between employment and obedience to
the law.
The ability of parties to waive implied contractual rights presents
a potential defect in a contractual retaliatory discharge action. 4
However, it is unlikely that seamen could validly waive enforcement
of a good faith limitation on the employer's discharge power. Professor
Litvinoff asserts that "neither the law nor the courts would ... take
• . . into account"85 any intention of the parties which contradicted
the implied duty of good faith performance. This proposition applies
with even greater force to maritime employment contracts because
those of equity and fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier .... Where
the line is to be drawn between the important and the trivial cannot be settled
by a formula. "In the nature of the case precise boundaries are impossible."
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242-43, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
The Smith court does not give clear guidance as to the scope of the tort claim
for retaliatory discharge. The court declares that the "maritime employer may discharge
the seaman . . . even, in most circumstances, for a morally reprehensible cause." 653
F.2d at 1063 (emphasis added). The employer cannot use his discharge power "as a
means of effectuating a 'purpose ulterior to that for which the right was designed.'"
Id. at 1062. Under this language, the particular circumstances in which the discharge
power is limited will have to be determined by future jurisprudence.
81. See text at notes 70-74, supra.
82. E.g., 46 C.F.R. S 35.15-5 (1981) (the engineer must notify the Coast Guard of
accidents which render the boilers or machinery unsafe).
83. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 11: "Individuals can not by their conventions, derogate
from the force of laws made for the preservation of public order or good morals."
See also Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959). But see, Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1982). In Gil, the employee was discharged after he refused to remove identifica-
tion marks from foreign steel; removal of the marks would have been illegal. The fourth
circuit mentions "Louisiana's traditional and unique deference to legislative authori-
ty," yet does not consider the applicability of Civil Code article 1901 to the claim.
84. See Note, A Common Law Action For the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1454 (1975).
85. S. LITVINOFF, supra note 65, at 7 n.28.
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seamen "are emphatically the wards of admiralty."86 Justice Story
describes the "rigid scrutiny"87 applied to seamen's contracts in Harden
v. Gordon:8
If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any disproportion
in the bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side which are not
compensated by extraordinary benefits on the other, the judicial
interpretation of the transaction, is that the bargain is unjust and
unreasonable, that advantage had been taken of the situation of
the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought to be set
aside as inequitable.88
At the very least, seamen should not be able to validly waive ap-
plication of the obligation of good faith performance to discharges in
retaliation for personal injury claims. The employer bears an awesome
burden in showing that a waiver which leaves seamen's compensa-
tion rights vulnerable to retaliatory discharge is supported by ade-
quate consideration. Further, such a waiver faces "an insurmountable
objection" 8 because it operates in "utter hostility" 1 to the maritime
compensation scheme 2 developed by the courts and Congress.
Judge Rubin's description of the common law retaliatory discharge
action is provocative because it suggests another basis of recovery
for retaliatory discharge. His analysis indicates that the essential ele-
ment of the claim is founded on "an abuse of ... right." 3 Under this
civilian doctrine, "when the holder of [a] right exercises his right
... for the satisfaction of an illegitimate interest . .. he abuses and
therefore ceases to have the power." 4 Damages can be awarded when
86. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
87. Id. at 485.
88. 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
89. Id. at 485.
90. Id. at 486.
91. Id.
92. See note 30, supra.
93. 653 F.2d at 1062.
94. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'EsPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITE: THEORIE DITE
DE L'ABus DEs DROITS (2d ed. 1939), translated in Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L.
REV. 965, 996 (1975). See generally Comment, supra note 68.
Civil law principles are not foreign to an admiralty court. "The admiralty courts
owe their origin largely to the civil law .... " The Kalfarli, 277 F. 391, 393 (2d Cir.
1921). "The admiralty jurisdiction is an institution borrowed from the civil-law system,
from which are derived the fundamentals of its substantive law as well as of its pro-
cedure." Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1933).
See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 36, at 8; 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY S 15,
at 1-32 (7th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1981). Further, "[clourts of admiralty are not, by their
constitution and jurisdiction, confined to the mere dry and positive rules of the com-
mon law." Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2,018).
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an abuse of right is established. 5
An abuse of right theory could support recovery in the instant
case. Discharging seamen in an attempt to avoid contractual and
statutory obligations constitutes an abuse of the employer's right to
terminate employment. Resort to this doctrine is not necessary in
Smith, however, because contract theory furnishes an adequate basis
for the seaman's claim. Yet, the abuse of right doctrine may prove
useful if the maritime judiciary decides to extend the retaliatory
discharge action beyond the ambit of protection provided by the duty
of good faith performance. For example, an admiralty court may be
asked to protect a seaman who, without a statutory obligation to do
so, "blows the whistle"" on his employer's unlawful activity. Good
faith would not prohibit the discharge because a disloyal employee
has a reasonable expectation that he will be fired." Yet, the policies
contravened by the employer may best be served by protecting the
reporting employee from retaliatory discharge. If a court made the
policy decision to protect the seaman, a return to tort principles could
provide a basis for liability. However, the absence of maritime locality
would again present the jurisdictional difficulties discussed previously."
The doctrine of abuse of rights might provide a viable alternative
to a tort theory of recovery in such a situation. The admiralty court
could hear an abuse of rights claim under a simple flavor test without
challenging the "locality plus flavor" standard for jurisdiction over
maritime torts."
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit properly recognized the need to pro-
tect a seaman's personal injury claim from his employer's power to
discharge at will. The safeguard afforded by the Jones Act is mean-
ingless unless the seaman's personal injury claim is insulated from
the threat of retaliatory discharge. However, the court's classifica-
tion of retaliatory discharge as a maritime tort presents problems
because the claim possesses the flavor but not the locality required
by the "locality plus flavor" test for tort jurisdiction. Resort to a sim-
ple flavor test would raise uncertainty as to both the application and
95. Cueto-Rua, supra note 93, at 991, 995 n.92.
96. See Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the
Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 777.
97. See id. at 778-79.
98. See text at notes 55-62, supra.
99. Arguably, an abuse of right claim should be recognized in admiralty only when
the right abused and the interest affected are maritime in nature. This limited ap-
plication of the doctrine would confine admiralty jurisdiction to abuse of rights claims
involving parties who expect maritime law to govern their relationships.
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the extent of admiralty jurisdiction over torts. By implying the obliga-
tion of good faith performance to the at-will employment contract,
the court could have classified retaliatory discharge as a breach of
contract. Jurisdiction over the cause of action would have arisen under
the accepted principle that a claim for a breach of a maritime con-
tract is cognizable in admiralty. In this manner, the court could have
mitigated the "inequities inherent"'00 in the at-will rule without rais-
ing the problems presented by a simple flavor test for jurisdiction
over maritime torts.
George Sheram King
100. 653 F.2d at 1063.
